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In 1691, when Johannes Vermeer’s Woman in Blue Reading a Letter was sold 
at auction in Amsterdam, the catalogue noted: ‘the charming light and dark 
suggest a splendid well-being’. The idea that well-being could be a matter 
of  shadows and light is very distant from our twenty-first-century concern 
with material and moral standings; the softness and suppleness of  Vermeer’s 
aesthetics very far from our current economic and political preoccupations. 
In this chapter I would like to suggest that there may be, however, a sense 
in which well-being is still today a matter of  appropriate illuminations, a 
matter of  finding the right balance between the visible and invisible elements 
of  social life. In thinking about the place of  well-being in human life, I have 
come to realise some of  the current deficiencies of  social theory. Finding an 
analytical place for well-being in social theory is a two-fold provocation: a 
realisation of  the limits of  our theoretical tools, and a call for an imaginative 
way forward. For well-being throws into relief  how difficult it is to talk about 
social life and human virtues simultaneously. It seems that our analytical 
vocabularies are good for one task or the other, but not for working on both 
at once. We have not yet quite found the right proportion between social 
analysis and a theory of  ethics. My aim in this chapter is to volunteer one 
such model of  proportional ethics. In fact, I would like to suggest that one 
possible way out of  this ethical-cum-sociological impasse may well lie in 
the idea of  proportionality itself. It may turn out that proportionality, the 
image of  the rightful balance, may work too as an analytic of  sociological 
righteousness. But this first entails unpacking the kind of  ‘proportionality’ 
that has figured centrally in Western political thought. This chapter is an 
attempt to sketch out such a recursive analytic, by playing off  the classical 
notion of  proportionality as ‘ethical balance’ against an assessment of  the 
‘proportions’ of  Euro-American social thought.
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AGGREGATION
Perhaps the single most important issue confronting economists and moral 
philosophers when devising indices of  well-being is that of  aggregation. The 
question of  aggregation emerges at almost every juncture of  the well-being 
problematic. It points to the fundamental question about well-being, which is 
about its size, and the location of  this size. (‘What is well-being?’ is so thorny 
an issue that is probably best left unanswered, and in a sense is contained in 
the first question, as I hope to show below.) James Griffin has expressed the 
metric nature of  well-being in the following terms: ‘When speaking of  well-
being, we all resort to quantitative language. We speak of  “more” and “less”. 
At times we aim to “maximize” well-being’ (1986: 75). Hidden in the question 
about the size of  well-being there is also the question about its location: where 
is well-being to be found? Is well-being located in individual persons or in 
collectivities? Is it a matter of  individual happiness, interpersonal relations 
or transcendental values? The question about the location of  well-being is 
therefore expressly an anthropological question, for it calls for a theory of  the 
workings of  society, and indeed of  the very terms that social groups employ 
to think of  themselves. To put it bluntly: we need to know how to look for 
society if  well-being is to be found in one or another of  its expressions.
The distribution of  society, that is, the mechanisms through which society 
becomes itself, will therefore determine the size of  well-being, and its location 
therein. Aggregation is part and parcel of  this analytic because whatever and 
wherever society is, well-being can only emerge as the concrete articulation of  
bits and pieces otherwise distributed across the social. Aggregation is the tool 
used to bring these bits and pieces together, which would otherwise probably 
not be on speaking terms with one another. Happiness and life expectancy, 
for instance, might both be elements of  social well-being, but they refer to 
different moments and values of  sociality, and as such are located and run 
along different social pathways. This diverse and plural occurrence of  well-
being raises the issue of  scale. Social well-being is often assumed to be the sum 
of  personal well-beings (health, happiness, freedom); and personal well-being 
is in turn taken to be an aggregate of  plural forms of  well-being, all found at 
the level of  the individual (different people want different things from life).1
The personal-to-the-social scale thus refers to the remit of  well-being, to its 
location within one of  many possible social worlds – this is a question about 
numbers, about how many units of  intra and interpersonal well-beings ought 
to be taken into account in our calculations: one individual or one million.
But there is another way in which the concept of  scale works and this is 
when referring to the nature of  the values that are summoned in the name 
of  well-being: happiness and life expectancy are different sort of  indices, 
as noted above, and each makes sense within its own scale. They may both 
be constituents (or determinants) of  well-being, but they point to different 
dimensions of  it – this, then, is a question about orders of  knowledge. Say 
that our society is made up of  one million people. The personal-to-the-social 
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scale might tell us the numbers that we have to compute (one million) to 
come up with an aggregate for well-being. But this kind of  scale will not work 
very well, or will not do enough, if  it turns out that what makes half  our 
population happy makes the other half  miserable. We need to know, then, 
not only whom to count (a question of  numbers), but also on what basis to 
count (a question of  orders of  knowledge). Making different kinds of  scales 
work together is not always easy, which is why aggregation is so important. 
I return to the notion of  the size or scale of  well-being in the conclusion.
Aggregation, then, appears in many guises when considering the relations 
of  sociality to well-being. In line with the above, we would expect there to 
be different modalities of  aggregation, and for different aggregations to play 
a different part in the imagination of  well-being. An issue that is implied by 
this vision is that well-being will vary with the workings of  society. That is, 
not with the kind of  society we live in, but with the way in which we think 
about the social. This is the main point of  this chapter and I will return to 
it on a number of  occasions. Suffice to say now that moral philosophy and 
economics have favoured a consequential view of  well-being, where the latter 
is a consequence of  particular social orderings. This, in my view, is clever 
economics but flawed social theory, for it works uniformly with one single 
model of  society. It sets out to measure well-being by adding or taking social 
bricks away from a ready-made model of  society; but it makes no attempt 
to rethink the nature of  the construction materials employed by society in 
the building of  its own changing edifice. This means that when we set out to 
measure or think about well-being what we are in effect doing is measuring 
and reifying a particular notion of  society, and of  the ways in which people 
make themselves available to the social body. We come up with a number but 
lose track of  the social; we end up focusing on the units that are aggregated 
and not on the mathematics of  aggregation. Society, in sum, disappears 
behind the fiction of  its measurement. 
This is a gloomy picture and, in a sense, an unfair representation of  the 
analytical powers of  aggregation. Much recent work on the social foundations 
of  well-being is expressly addressed at correcting this fiction and does so 
by enlarging our perspective on the infrastructure of  well-being, looking 
at ‘the quality of  the transactions in which the individual can take part, 
which means taking an interest in a background of  inherited possibilities’ 
(Douglas and Ney 1998: 61–62). Mary Douglas and Steven Ney have recently 
reviewed these attempts at taking account of  the social and institutional 
structures of  well-being, and have in turn developed a model of  the person 
that aims to redefine social theory around these measuring refinements. But 
there is another way in which the work of  economists may in fact be of  use 
to social theory, though it involves a rather imaginative application of  the 
notion of  aggregation. I want to suggest that the concept of  aggregation (and 
its reverse, disaggregation or distribution) may have formidable analytical 
mileage if  used as a social analytic, one that allows us to move away from
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worn-out models of  society and that further allows us to substantiate the 
political purchase of  well-being. Let me explain how.
DISTRIBUTION
The question of  aggregation is at the heart of  an old agenda in economics, 
namely, social choice theory. In its programmatic form, social choice theory 
was laid out by Kenneth Arrow in 1951. It was motivated by the following 
central issue: how can it be possible to arrive at cogent aggregative judgments 
about, say, social welfare, collective interest, or aggregate poverty (Sen 1999b: 
349)? Perplexed by these summative difficulties, Arrow’s pioneering work 
concluded by stating the impossibility of  social choice. More recently, on 
occasion of  his Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences lecture, Amartya Sen took 
up the task of  discussing some of  the challenges and foundational problems 
of  social choice theory and concluded on a more positive note, by advocating 
the need for broadening the informational basis of  social choices, such as the 
use of  interpersonal comparisons of  well-being and individual advantage (Sen 
1999b). In a nutshell, Sen’s vision is that the predicament of  well-being is 
best confronted if  we substitute the problem of  distribution for the problem 
of  aggregation (if  we ‘open up’ our image of  society, with more information, 
for instance), and if  we further look beyond distribution to the entitlements or 
capabilities that allow people to make claims on the goods to be distributed and 
on their own development as human persons. Let me look at this transition 
more closely.
A crucial starting point of  social choice theory is the analytic that it 
employs to conjure up an image of  society. Sen makes the point succinctly 
when asking: ‘How can we judge how well society as a whole is doing in the 
light of  the disparate interests of  its different members?’ (Sen 1999b: 350, 
emphasis in the original). Marilyn Strathern has brought the same question 
home to anthropology when arguing that:
To think of  society as a thing is to think of  it as a discrete entity. The theoretical task 
then becomes one of  elucidating ‘the relationship’ between it and other entities. This 
is a mathematic, if  you will, that sees the world as inherently divided into units. The 
significant corollary of  this view is that relationships appear as extrinsic to such units: 
they appear as secondary ways of  connecting things up. (Strathern 1990: 5)
The question of  society’s ‘wholeness’, then, raises three questions: about 
the idea of  society as a whole or entity; about the parts that make up a whole; 
and about the mathematic (that is, the analytic) that we use to think about 
the social. The three are related, but I address them in turn.
For much of  the twentieth century, welfare economics was concerned 
with the issue of  how to make appraisals of  the ordering of  social states. If  
everybody in society A is happy and everybody in society B is not, then one 
ought to be able to find the factor that makes the social order in A preferable 
to that in B. For many years, economists and moral philosophers used utility
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as a measure of  such factor, and social states were ranked in terms of  the sum-
total of  utilities that their respective orderings yielded. (Many measures of  
utility were employed. I use the term here loosely to refer to them all.) Utility, 
then, became a proxy for society, which thence ceased to exist as an idea and 
assumed the semblance of  a whole number instead. This is the question of  
social wholes, where society or its proxies are imagined as numerical units 
and are made to work analytically as such.
Economists and philosophers know as well as anthropologists that ‘wholes’ 
are useful fictions. They serve a purpose, though they are also very murky 
analytical tools. Take the infamous case of  ‘society’: where does a society 
start and end? In a friendship, a generation or an economic stream of  inter-
generations? What counts as a whole is a question whose pragmatics will 
bounce back with a vengeance  – however we count, we are bound to leave 
some people out, or take people in for the wrong reasons (that is, reasons 
that are not the same for all). Now economists have tended to deal with the 
complications of  wholes by means of  the concept of  ‘distribution’. In relation 
to well-being, Partha Dasgupta explains it thus:
To speak of  social well-being is to speak in aggregate terms. There is, however, a danger 
that by an ‘aggregate’ one understands some sort of  average. This isn’t the way I am 
using the term here. The kind of  aggregate I have in mind reflects a comprehensive 
notion of  aggregate well-being, including as it does not only average well-being, but 
also other features of  the distribution of  well-being, such as its variance, skewness, and 
so forth. In common parlance, features other than the average of  the distribution of  a 
thing are called the ‘distributional features’ of  that thing. (Dasgupta 2001: 19)
Distribution is a useful notion because, although it preserves the fiction 
of  wholes, it inflects the latter with a sense of  heterogeneous weights, thus 
observing that not all wholes have the same make-up. (Two societies may 
have identical measurements of  well-being, but whereas in one society one 
person is the sole contributor to social well-being, the others being destitute, 
in another society well-being is evenly distributed amongst all its members.) 
The heterogeneity to which distribution is a remedy has two moments: an 
allocational or institutional one, and a social one.
Allocational distribution is what economists have largely been concerned 
with: coming up with weights that make up for the inequalities of  society. 
There are many such weights, some focusing on the commodity determinants
of  well-being (potable water, food, education, etc.), some on its constituents
(health, freedom, happiness). A distributional weight may point and aim to 
correct my lack of  access to food; but it will not be of  much effect if  does not 
call out at the same time my inability to vote out of  office the people who are 
deliberately keeping the food away from me in the first place. The latter points 
to the question of  ‘negative freedom’: freedom from arbitrary interference, 
and is the trademark of  Dasgupta’s important refinement to Sen’s deservedly 
famous capabilities approach to well-being (Dasgupta 1993; Sen, 1999a). 
Allocational distribution, then, has nothing or very little to say about society; 
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it is solely concerned with the institutional mechanisms that make sure that 
society works fine, and with making sure that people feel comfortable with 
such working arrangements. In allocational models, society is in place, and 
one allocates and makes decisions against it.
My larger point here is that allocational distribution must be a variant of  
social distribution, which antecedes and informs it. When economists make up 
for ill-distributed well-being what they are in effect doing is compensating for 
a social distribution already in place; that is, they are re-distributing the social. 
Society comes into being in distributive episodes, one of  which is awakening 
to the fact that we should rethink our social distribution. An early anthro-
pological advocate of  this vision was Stephen Gudeman (1978). Though his 
approach at the time was essentially allocational, looking at the question of  
the origin and use of  a society’s ‘surplus value’ or ‘output allocation’, it is 
still the case that for him distribution operates relationally: ‘distribution as 
a meaningful system, distribution in light of  social forces, and distribution 
as a structure’ (Gudeman 1978: 374) – that is, a structure of  social choices 
and social values, or a reflection of  how, in its distributive episodes, a society 
stretches and branches out as it chooses its future image.
The idea of  social distribution, or of  the distribution of  the social, is perhaps 
best presented in the work of  Marilyn Strathern (for example, Strathern 
1988). Most famously, the language of  distribution takes form in her notion of  
‘distributed personhood’, where persons emerge as social beings in moments 
of  relational efficacy, like when they make themselves available to others 
in acts of  ceremonial gift-giving. This is why in a book aimed to engage an 
economic audience, Mary Douglas has observed that ‘When Strathern says… 
that for “person” one could write “gift,” she is not being flippant.’ (Douglas 
and Ney 1998: 9) If  persons emerge as moments of  distribution – distribution 
of  themselves in others and others in themselves – then what we need to look 
out for are the values or idioms through which a society decides to conduct 
its own branching-out. This is where the idea of  the distributed person meets 
the theory of  economy, and in particular of  moral economy. If  the person 
becomes an element in, or even the carrier of  society’s distributional base 
(Gudeman 2001), then it is only legitimate to suggest that persons make 
the social good (that is, well-being) available to others in their capacity of  
distributing themselves in a certain fashion (Strathern 1981). How they 
become available is therefore a matter of  the quality of  the relations that 
they set up with others.
This introduces us to the second question about the wholeness of  a society: 
the relationship of  the parts to the whole, or what Dasgupta, in the quote 
above, calls the ‘distributional features’ of  things. Our habit of  aggregating 
parts into wholes is emblematic of  what linguists call a partonomic mode of  
classification. John Davis has observed that partonomies are just one way in 
which people establish links with other people and things, other ways being 
pairing and taxonomic classifications (Davis 1992: 34–37). What appears 
to be distinctive about partonomies, however, is that they are very good at 
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making explicit the logic behind material transactions. Davis’s own examples 
capture it nicely:
Gifts between friends should more or less balance; gifts exchanged between parents and 
hildren should be unequal. Altruists should expect no return, while alms-givers may 
quite legitimately hope for a supernatural reward. All these are different appropriate 
relations between income and outgo…. In summary, an intended exchange is a balance 
of  two partonomies. (avis 1992: 40–1)
Note the language in which Davis explains the relations between transacting 
partners: ‘balance’, ‘return’, ‘equality’, ‘appropriateness’. Exchange relations 
are qualified by a controlled give-and-take, a measured equilibrium that 
makes sure that things do not get out of  proportion, as they do in potlatch 
ceremonies, for instance. As Mary Douglas has noted, a ‘community works 
because the transactions balance out’ (1986: 74, emphasis added).What is 
brought into balance is a measure of  the portion of  society that we want to 
make available to others; and so the gift, by obviation, signals also the size 
of  society that is not available for distribution. The part that we give is an 
indication of  the whole that is not given – what you see (the gift) is what you 
do not get (the larger social whole). Gift-giving is thus an expression and 
effect of  proportionality.
Economic proportionality can be useful to think about other forms of  
sociality too. The imagery is for instance at the heart of  Marilyn Strathern 
and Roy Wagner’s writings on fractality, where relations self-replicate 
across different orders of  magnitude. The paradigmatic case here is the 
individual vs. society dichotomy, for however we define society, individuals 
will always be seen as a fraction or proportion of  the social whole (Strathern 
1992a, 1992b). But individuality itself  is of  course also subject to fractal 
partitioning, as in the image of  the pregnant woman or, for that matter, in 
the potential for future relations that all people carry within. Fractality is 
thus not unlike Davis’s partonomic model of  classification, except that in 
the former parts and wholes work across and within different scales, so that 
there will always be a scale where any part will figure as a whole and any 
whole will stand as a part (Strathern 1991, 1995). To pursue a flippant 
analogy: if  a gift signals the invisible size of  society, an individual works as 
a proportional ‘remainder’, as was noted in the Introduction to the volume. 
That is, individuals are what Euro-Americans give away to keep their social 
wholes (that is, ‘society’) at home.
This may all sound of  little empirical relevance to the problem of  well-
being were it not for the question with which I opened this chapter: where is 
well-being located? We saw that, to be fair to the distribution of  well-being in 
society, we first had to disaggregate the concept and look to its emergence in 
distributive episodes. These were in turn defined by the qualities of  relations, 
which came together in the carrying capacities of  persons. But these carrying 
capacities work differently at different orders or scales of  sociality. Individuals 
may be good carriers of  society and thus a good place where to locate well-
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being. However, we ought to remember that individuals are just proportional 
factors of  society, and that for some purposes, or in some circumstances, a 
society will afford a much fairer and even distribution of  well-being if  it uses 
a different proportional model. Take the case of  intergenerational well-being. 
If  we use the individual as the site and carrier of  well-being, the soon-to-be-
born child of  a pregnant woman – let alone the child’s child – will not be 
factored into our calculations of  social wealth – future generations are not 
part of  an individual’s whole. In order to take future generations into account 
we need to modify our aggregational and distributional model. And so it is 
that one is tempted to locate well-being not in wholes but in proportions, 
for it is ultimately in a proportional manner that we decide what to factor in 
and what to leave out (Strathern 1996). This brings me to the last question 
about the wholeness of  society, namely, the type of  mathematic that we use 
to think about the social.
PROPORTIONS
The use of  terms like ‘individual choice’, ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ measures 
of  well-being, or even the use of  market frameworks as models of  social 
interaction, belies the relational analytic that underpins current work on 
the measurement of  well-being, such as Amartya Sen’s capability approach 
or Partha Dasgupta’s generation-relative ethics (see also Offer 1996). Their 
focus on interpersonal comparisons, intergenerational streams of  wealth 
and sustainable development, shows that theirs is not a mathematic of  social 
wholes but of  relations, even if  their descriptive language suggests otherwise. 
True, their use of  relations is methodological, not analytic – it informs their 
efforts at measuring well-being, not their social theory. But decades of  work 
on the problem of  well-being by economists and political philosophers has 
shown that aggregation and the ensuing problem of  distribution are factorial 
in how one thinks about the social good. So integral is their resolution to the 
question of  well-being that one is tempted to think that they may in fact be 
part and parcel (part and whole) of  the very workings of  society – that is, 
the very way in which the social apportions itself.
Social apportionments are of  course distributive episodes, and as such 
are informed by a relational analytic. But unlike relations, which only tell 
you how to disaggregate, apportionments tell you what to disaggregate into. 
Apportionments are relations of  magnitude and thus carry with them a 
value judgement (cf. Griffin 1996). The relational work they do is inflected 
by this magnitude and shows up in the final allocation. In other words, 
the apportionment is the form the relation takes when it emerges as a 
consequence; or to say it somewhat differently, when it works as a proportion 
(Corsín Jiménez 2003). I go back to the problem of  disaggregating intergen-
erational well-being. Parents care for the well-being of  their children, so it is 
in their own interest to make the necessary provisions to pass on to them a 
‘good-enough world’. The question is, good enough for whom? For it is clear 
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that eventually their children will face the same concern, and so will their 
grandchildren, and so on. Good-enough-for-whom, then, entails a decision 
on how many futures will the current generation discount when making 
up their minds on the current valuation of  well-being. Not only that, but 
also whether all futures are worth the same or some are worth more than 
others. Accounting for the well-being of  the 400th generation down from 
ours may not only be burdensome but of  little avail altogether, for there are 
just too many imponderables getting in the way of  our predictions. So a 
concern with intergenerational well-being presupposes a relational analytic, 
but this is ultimately of  little help in understanding how people work out 
their life-projects. People care a lot for their children, yes; but they might 
find it just a little too difficult to take account of  the care for their great-
great-grandchildren. Relationships, then, are not worked out linearly but 
proportionately, and it is towards the elucidation of  a proportional model of  
sociality that we should strive.
PROPORTIONAL SOCIALITY
A model of  the workings of  society based on the idea of  proportional 
distribution may look like an unlikely pill to swallow. Unlike individuals, or 
even relations, proportions are difficult to visualise, or so it would seem. This 
may simply be a matter of  perspective, however. I would like to suggest that 
not only are there good analytical reasons to take up the model, but that 
there are also firm historical foundations to support it, which have also, in the 
process, inflected our theories of  political ethics. It may be that history has 
kept its perspective on proportions hidden from view, a point recently raised 
by Jonathan Israel (2001) apropos the contribution of  Spinoza’s geometrical 
thought to the fashioning of  philosophical modernity.
I realise that this is of  course no place where to sketch a history of  the 
idea of  proportional sociality; but I would nevertheless like to point to some 
historical uses of  the image of  the proportion, for I believe it can illuminate 
some aspects of  the current political purchase of  the concept of  well-being in 
liberal societies. In a nutshell, my argument is that social theory is strongly 
geometrical (that is, proportional) and that it is important to acknowledge the 
mechanical principles of  our theoretical toolkit if  we are to put our models 
to full and good use. Not to do so is to fall for a political conception of  social 
well-being that is disembedded from how people relate to one another. It is 
to look for well-being where it is not, and to demand social responsibilities 
where they do not apply.
In one sense, the idea of  proportionality is as old as political thought 
itself. It is for instance a fundamental premise of  Greek political theory, for 
it is to be found at work within its metaphysic, from where it informs much 
of  its cosmology and politics. This is particularly evident in the thought of  
Plato. Like all classical Greek thought, Plato’s political vision is founded on 
principles of  cosmological correspondence: political relations grow out of  the 
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application of  the same rules that organise the cosmos, which hence figures 
as the all-encompassing scale. All relations have a place in the cosmos and 
nest within it in varying orders of  hierarchy. Nature, man and society are 
to be ‘adjusted’ (dike) in one ethical and cosmic relation, and if  carried out 
properly (if  relations are properly apportioned) this justification produces 
nómos or custom. In a state of  tradition or equilibrium, the virtues of  man 
mirror the virtues of  the politeia, though each is worked out on a different 
scale and the cosmic principle of  ‘just apportionments’ (dike) is what keeps the 
correspondence in place. One may call this order of  correspondence a fractal 
ordering, for all relations contain within themselves the wider cosmological 
equilibrium towards which they contribute. The notion of  fractality was, 
however, foreign to Greek thought; but proportionality, of  which fractality 
is a more sophisticated expression, was not, and in this light the model may 
be seen as one of  cosmological proportionality (or just apportionment).
There is another way in which the imagery of  proportionality was at 
work in classical Greek thought, one that addresses directly the analytical 
tools that we use in economic anthropology. This is Aristotle’s metaphysic of  
exchange relations. Upon confronting the problem of  exchange, Aristotle’s 
underlying aim was of  course to remain faithful to the model of  cosmological 
correspondence (which is why his discussions of  exchange are to be found in 
the Nicomachean Ethics). But as soon as he starts to work on the problem of  
exchange, he is struck by the mystery of  commensurability: how can things 
that are by nature of  a different kind be brought into exchange equations? 
How can shoes be exchanged for houses? Aristotle was of  course the first to 
make the distinction between use and exchange values, and in his mind the 
problem of  commensurability is the problem of  the transformation of  value: of  
one thing being exchanged, and therefore changed, for another. Scott Meikle 
has studied Aristotle’s economic thought and has uncovered the proportional 
imagery that guides his understanding of  this transformation:
Aristotle takes the first step towards defining the particular form of  reciprocity that 
is appropriate in the context of  exchange. He says it is ‘reciprocity … on the basis of  
proportion, not on the basis of  equality’. The reciprocity must be of  proportions of  
things, not the ‘simple reciprocity’ of  Rhadamanthys, which would mean giving one 
thing for one thing. It would not be fair for a builder and a shoemaker to exchange one 
house for one shoe, because a house is too great or too much to give for a shoe. So they 
must exchange in proportions, so many shoes to a house. (Meikle 1995: 10)
Aristotle never quite resolved the paradox of  proportional commensura-
bility. He studied the logic of  barter and the development of  money, but in 
the end was incapable of  explaining satisfactorily how use values become 
exchange values. The problem, however, remained crucial to him, for he 
thought that it was on the basis of  reciprocal relations that larger political 
associations flourished. Whatever it was that brought people to exchange, 
proportional reciprocity enabled the ‘holding together’ of  the polis (Meikle 
1995: 35–37).
Jimenez 02 chap06 189     16/8/07 09:19:6   
190 Culture and Well-Being
Aristotle worked within the horizon of  the good life. Proportional com-
mensurability and the ‘holding together’ of  society were foundational bricks 
of  the good life, which was accomplished if  and only if  there was a proper 
distribution of  relations in the polis – that is, if  the relations of  exchange, 
and the relations of  political obligation that were built upon these, were 
allowed to develop into and assume their natural telos. The good life was a 
metaphysical possibility of  the good society, which was in turn a metaphysical 
development of  fair exchange. Fairness was a metaphysical postulate of  
Aristotle’s political theory.
It is important to keep in mind the metaphysical assumptions behind 
Aristotle’s political theory, and in particular his metaphysic of  exchange 
relations or proportional commensurability, for it is these assumptions that 
were viciously attacked by Hobbes in the wake of  the seventeenth century’s 
scientific revolution. Hobbes, unlike Aristotle, saw no reason why one should 
emphasize the distributive fairness of  relationships. The nature of  exchange, 
he argued, was arithmetic, not geometric; there were no good reasons for 
upholding proportional equivalences in exchange. A shoe is a fair exchange 
item for a house, if  people want it to be so. What Hobbes was in effect saying 
was that the terms of  political association should not be qualified by a fictitious 
distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ (Macpherson 1962: 70–87): what people 
do is what ought to be done, and contractual agreements entered into freely 
by free, desirous agents are exemplary of  fair justice:
Justice of  Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative and Distributive: and the 
former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall; the latter in proportion 
Geometricall. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of  value of  the things 
contracted for; And Distributive, in the distribution of  equal benefit, to men of  equall 
merit. As if  it were Injustice to sell dearer that we buy; or to give more to a man than 
he merits. The value of  all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of  the 
Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. 
(Hobbes 1991 [1651]: 105)
Hobbes’s critique of  distributive justice was part of  the post-Reformation 
and anti-Aristotelian movement that culminated in the birth of  the nuova 
scientia in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Hobbesian 
political thought was itself  the foundation of  what C.B. Macpherson (1962) 
has called ‘possessive individualism’, a theory of  political organisation that 
sees the individual as the proprietor of  his own person and capacities, and 
that is at the root of  modern liberal-democratic theory. My reading of  Hobbes 
is somewhat different, however, and although I have no contention with 
Macpherson’s lucid diagnosis of  the origins of  possessive individualism, I 
would like to suggest that, despite his best efforts at repudiating Aristotelian 
metaphysics, Hobbes remained faithful to the model of  proportional sociality 
that informed Aristotle’s politics. Working tacitly or explicitly within the 
Hobbesian and Aristotelian models, the lubricant of  social organisation is 
always a mechanism of  proportional sociality.
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The source of  Hobbes’s proportionalism is to be found in his Galilean 
baggage, what, following Peter Machamer (1998b), I call his Archimedean 
vision of  the workings of  the world. Machamer has argued that Galileo’s work 
and scientific orientation was premised on a model of  intelligibility based on 
the image of  the Archimedean balance: ‘The principle to be noted is that for 
Galileo the whole schema of  intelligibility becomes putting a question in the 
form of  an equilibrium problem: What is the cause of  (or force that causes) 
something becoming unbalanced? Where is the balance point?’ (Machamer 
1998a: 60). In order to solve such problems of  equilibrium, seventeenth-
century scientists turned to the construction of  mechanical models. These 
mechanical models fulfilled their aspirations for ‘demonstrative proof ’, which, 
as Hobbes put it, ‘was understood by them for that sort of  ratiocination that 
placed the thing they were to prove, as it were before mens eyes’ (cited in 
Machamer 1998b: 15). Perhaps more significantly, the preferred form of  
such representations was taken to be spatial displays, and in particular those 
based on proportional geometry, which replicated the workings of  the world 
as being founded on the balance of  magnitudes and the general relational 
measurement (ratios) of  things. In the writings of  Galileo this concern with 
proportionality is even used as a metaphor for clear thought, as when he 
writes that: ‘Human understanding or reason (ragione) is having the correct 
measure (ratio) for things’ (cited in Machamer 1998a: 63). For seventeenth-
century scientists, then, the mechanics of  the world were proportional, and 
both the epistemology and method of  our enquiries were supposed to mirror 
these mechanics of  ratiocination.2
It is to this proportional natural philosophy that Hobbes bowed. His theory 
of  man and social relationships was a theory of  motion, of  the balance of  forces 
that moved people to associate or fight with one another. For Hobbes, men 
were ‘automated machines’, ‘self-moving’ and ‘self-directing’ (Macpherson 
1962: 31). He explained everything, from free will to social interaction, by 
resorting to a mechanics of  pressure and bodily push: perception, for instance, 
had its origin in the diffusion of  species that foreign bodies emitted and their 
pressing on the eye of  the observer. Likewise, motivation and action were the 
outcome of  excitement and the pressure of  the appetites, or their aversion, 
towards different objects. Man, in sum, was an arithmetical creature: ‘the 
whole summe of  Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, continued till the thing 
be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION’ (Hobbes 
1991: 44, emphasis added). This is why J.W.N. Watkins called The Leviathan
‘the political expression of  the Galilean theory of  motion’ (1955: 129), a 
thought that finds its echo in Hobbes’s own capitulatory expression, ‘Life it 
selfe is but Motion’ (1991: 46).
It is well known that Hobbes’s model of  possessive individualism became the 
standard formulation of  liberal-democratic society (Macpherson 1962), and 
in this sense his mathematics of  society, based on the arithmetic of  individual 
volitions, has become common stock in social theory, and especially so in 
economic theory. The model did not remain unchallenged, of  course, and 
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perhaps the most famous of  the neo-Aristotelians was Marx himself  (see, for 
example Meikle 1994). Neo-Aristotelianism is another word for a mathematic 
of  society that comes to terms with its own aggregative structure, with its own 
varying shapes and ‘geometric justice’: that is, a model of  social interaction 
that takes stock of, and makes the effort of  actualising itself  through, the 
distribution of  its ‘parts’.
It is this history also, the history of  the idea of  social justice as an expression 
of  proportionality, that Derrida (1995) has recently resurrected in his reading 
of  Heidegger’s philosophy of  justice. Following Heidegger, Derrida (1995: 
37) recognises the analytical purchase – and yet problematic nature – of  
the original Greek term dike (the image of  proportionality and balance; the 
principle of  ‘just apportionment’) for re-centring and making the political rest 
on the dynamic of  gift relationships. Echoing Hamlet’s famous sentence, ‘The 
time is out of  joint’, Derrida ascribes a quality of  ‘out-of-jointness’ to all social 
life, and thus to the very possibility of  human justice. For Derrida, gift-giving 
and debt-honouring are both paradigmatic expressions of  the necessary 
asynchrony of  human sociality (1995: 40). They are both indicative of  a 
form of  life that is always, existentially, out-of-synch with itself: a shadow 
of  its own condition. In this view, social life is always falling short of  itself, 
gesturing towards its own disproportion, because of  its own phenomenology 
as a process of  becoming. With Derrida, then, I want to suggest that it is 
the irresolvable nature of  this asynchrony – the paradox of  proportional 
incommensurability – that works as the engine of  social life everywhere. It 
is the confusion of  not knowing how and which orders of  knowledge have 
to be made commensurable, or the realisation that commensurability, when 
accomplished, is frail and temporary, that makes social life continuously re-
dimension itself.3
CONCLUSION
Earlier in the chapter I used the expression ‘social mathematic’ to point to 
the ways in which we think about the social. We have seen that different 
authors use different categories to build their images of  society. The word 
‘society’ itself  is strongly associated with a mathematic of  wholes, for once 
we talk about society it is difficult not to reify it as an entity. Economists 
in particular have had much difficulty resisting the temptation of  working 
arithmetically with these wholes. Much of  the recent work on the problem 
of  well-being by Amartya Sen or Partha Dasgupta may be read as a heroic 
effort to refashion the economic corpus with the use of  geometric models of  
society. The analytics of  aggregation and distribution, for instance, are tools 
devised to help economists move away from a social theory that takes society 
for granted. They allow economists and moral philosophers to de-objectify 
the social and work with its moments of  articulation instead. 
Anthropologists, on the other hand, have long had an interest in these 
moments of  articulation, to which we have traditionally referred to as ‘social 
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relationships’. But I think it is fair to say that we have now arrived at a point 
where anthropology is close to fetishising its own analytic, doing with social 
relationships what economists once did with the ‘individual’ and ‘society’. In 
drawing attention to the different analytical vocabularies of  economists and 
anthropologists, my aim has been to emphasise the importance of  rethinking 
our conceptual imaginaries, a task to which I dare say some economists have 
been dedicating themselves with far greater passion and urge than most 
anthropologists. Of  particular interest are the methodological efforts that 
economists have made to disaggregate society. In this chapter I have singled 
out two such tools: aggregation and distribution. I have suggested that both 
methodologies may be put to formidable analytical use if  applied to help us 
disentangle the workings of  social forms. I believe that, if  used as analytical 
categories, aggregation and distribution can tell us a great deal about how 
people relate to one another; in particular, they can help us qualify our 
traditional relational analytic, pointing us to the forms that relationships 
take. That is, they can tell us how a relationship becomes a proportion.
In the language of  classical political theory, a proportional model of  
sociality is neo-Aristotelian4 and geometric: it discusses how people measure 
and distribute their choices, and how the possibility of  choice refashions and 
resizes people’s self-conceptions. It shows that all choices, even the choices 
made by a Hobbesian automated agent, are proportional choices: a measure 
of  the capacity of  ‘society’ to make itself  available to its members through 
certain forms of  proportional distribution. Put somewhat differently, pro-
portionality tells us the effort that people have to make, to extract their own 
self-image as distributive and capable agents.5
In the Hobbesian model of  liberal self-extraction, the effort people have 
to make is scant: it affects only them, for they are the sole yardstick of  their 
measured actions – the ratio of  the proportion is a flat zero. It is not, then, 
that there is no proportionality at work, but rather that it has been bracketed 
off: the part and the whole are one and the same thing; the individual is the 
measure of  society.
In contrast, in, say, Melanesian societies, where personhood takes a 
distributive fashion, the pain that people have to go to is considerable, for 
it stretches out from, and has sources of  agency outside, the individuated 
person: People are what their relations to others makes them be (for example, 
Strathern 1988). Now, the trouble with the Melanesian model is that although 
proportionality is not zero, it is nevertheless a constant, and it is therefore 
assumed that people always relate in the same fashion – a relation is a relation 
is a relation. But: 
… [o]ne person cannot suffice as the measure of  another, but reflects only that part 
which is invested in the relationship in question. Thus from others one ever only gets 
a partial perspective on oneself. In the same way, one’s own external presentation 
remains out of  proportion to one’s internal disposition. (Strathern 1992a: 132)
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A full model of  proportional sociality, then, is one that takes into account 
the different ways in which people inflect and qualify their relationships. 
Proportional sociality tells us the factors by which the stretching out of  
the social takes place. It talks about how people re-scale their biographical 
projects.
This brings me to the question with which I opened the chapter, about the 
location and the size of  well-being. It is clear that if  different people factor 
their relationships in different and varying proportions, the size of  their 
social interactions will vary; that is, the kind of  sociality they set in motion 
will have different weights or dimensions. The consequence of  this is rather 
obvious, and that is that not everything that people do is directed towards 
the enhancement of  their well-being. Heidegger once said that the crucial 
ontological question was: ‘Why is there Being, and not simply Nothing?’ The 
same could be said about well-being. A notion of  well-being is by default a 
notion of  a lack – of  something that there is, but not quite in the proportion 
that we would like it there to be. This is of  course why the economic idea of  
measuring well-being is not entirely a misguided notion, for if  social life had 
reached its full potential (call it happiness, well-being, virtue, whatever), 
then there would be nothing to measure well-being against – indeed, the 
very idea of  well-being would be incomprehensible. My larger point is that 
the project of  an anthropology of  well-being demands inexorably a model of  
proportional sociality, for however we define well-being, it will always need to 
be something less than perfect social life: it will always entail a ‘remaindering 
of  life’ (Lear 2000). It will always therefore have a size and will always need 
to be expressed in one kind of  social scale or another6 – and the location of  
this size and scale will always be the person.
Our awareness of  topological re-dimensioning, of  social forms continuously 
changing size and effects (that is, of  their inherent re-scaling properties), 
provides us with an extraordinary tool with which to enhance our category 
of  the person. It allows for a novel and stronger theory of  personhood, where 
people emerge as the proportional factors and carriers of  social life. Mary 
Douglas and Steven Ney (1998) have recently pointed out the extent to 
which the social sciences have taken the person for granted. Social life has 
been seen to work upon persons, or from them, but not through them, as 
their own sizing projects. An analytic of  social life that focuses on the size
of  sociality, however, will necessarily have to point, too, to the shape that 
human life takes in the form of  biographical and historical projects. Persons 
are not simply agents, or actors, or rational decision-makers. They are the 
site where social life becomes strong because it becomes their own. Persons 
are social life writ small, expressed in emerging forms of  proportional (that 
is, biographical) sociality. 
To conclude, my aim in this chapter has been to sketch the foundations 
of  a social theory that will live up to the efforts that moral philosophers and 
economists have invested into tackling the problem of  the estimation of  well-
being. I have tried to show that an analytic that accommodates some of  their 
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very important contributions requires us to reformulate our social theory, 
and in particular that it requires us to rethink some of  the basic categories 
through which we make up our images of  the social. I have suggested that one 
such model of  sociality may be founded on the idea of  proportional sociality, 
for the notion of  proportional relationships seems to have underpinned the 
political thought of  scholars from the Classical period to our age. Perhaps 
more importantly, the notion of  proportional sociality appears well suited to 
the task of  addressing the problem of  well-being because it accommodates 
itself  to the distributional and aggregational tactics of  economic models. 
It learns from economics, but it also points to where the social theory of  
economists has gone wrong. Last, a model of  proportional sociality allows 
us to make a case for a stronger theory of  personhood, where people become 
themselves so long as they have the capacity to hold and envision their own 
projects of  virtue ethics. And it is perhaps in the nature of  such intellectual 
engagements (between economics, moral philosophy and anthropology, 
between the factual and the possible) that an enquiry into the nature of  a 
problem as intractable as that of  well-being may obtain new and refreshing 
sources of  impetus.
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NOTES
1. This is debatable, although the literature tends to be unanimous on this point; Dasgupta 
is representative: ‘Not only is the socio-economic personal, the political is personal too: 
it is the individual that matters’ (2001: 13).
2. Cohen has observed how the application of  the imagery and vocabulary of  the natural 
sciences to the social sciences reached a dead end with the development of  Newtonian 
natural philosophy: 
   The reason is that the Newtonian system of  the world, the application of  Newtonian 
rational mechanics, does not lend itself  to a mechanical model or visualization in 
the human mind that can easily be transferred to an image of  society at large or to 
economics. (Cohen 1994: 61) 
 This may be why most social theory works within a Galilean paradigm, and why recent 
innovations in our sociological vocabulary echo those of  topological mathematics, 
whose development finally allowed overcoming the intractability of  the three body 
problem in (Newtonian) physics. Examples of  the use of  topological metaphors in 
sociology can be found in the work of  John Law (for example 1999), and in actor-
network theory more widely (Law and Hassard 1999). An early anthropological use 
can be found in Leach (1961). 
3. I thank Marilyn Strathern for prompting me to think about the different origins 
of  perspectives (orders of  knowledge/reality) and their reconciliation, or not, in 
proportional encounters.
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4. I use the term incautiously, almost provocatively. But I still find it appropriate, especially 
on two fronts. First, an Aristotelian model of  sociality points to the extent to which 
social life emerges in distributive episodes, and in particular to the structure of  these 
episodes as moments of  proportional equivalence, however frail and transient these 
equivalences may be (see note 2, above). Second, it is strongly ethical, envisioning social 
life through the lens of  robust projects of  virtue ethics played out at the level of  the person
(for example, Hursthouse 1999; MacIntyre 1985; Nussbaum 1996). As it happens, 
this ethical tradition is congenial with Amartya Sen’s capability approach (Nussbaum 
1988) and, I believe, offers wonderful new opportunities for anthropological theory.
5. My vocabulary is not gratuitous: the Latin etymology for ‘choice’ is traced to the 
word elegire, which was originally used to denote the capacity to cultivate and extract 
whatever the fertility of  the land could afford. The imagery of  extraction is of  course 
also present in Roy Wagner’s (1975) account of  the forms that the emergence of  social 
life takes.
6. I use the term ‘scale’ in a double sense: scale as size and scale as idiom . The image 
is, once again, Archimedean: one category presses and gets translated into another 
category, and the translation brings forth its own effects. If  the natural environment is 
the modern scale of  well-being, then environmentalism will necessarily have to change 
the size of  society. The environment can only be factored into society, if  society is re-
proportioned and changes size. Scales are therefore orders of  knowledge that carry 
forth their own magnitudinal effects. This may be why ‘the global’ is Euro-American 
society’s current proportional self-descriptor.
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